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ABSTRACT

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the international community has been
confronted with numerous challenges and power shifts. On the one hand, upheavals in the
Middle East greatly challenge world peace. On the other hand, a rapidly developing Asia
is gradually changing the international structure. Many scholars in the United States
worry that America’s liberty and security are challenged by all kinds of political, cultural,
and strategic changes. Both domestic and foreign policies are facing hard choices of what
should be done next.
This paper focuses on the question of what appropriate foreign policy the U.S.
should pursue in the Asia-Pacific, particularly toward China—one of the major powers in
East Asia. The main presupposition is that the two countries should firmly consider
cooperation as the primary foreign policy goal because good Sino-American relations
would not only bring about mutual benefits, but also facilitate the peace and stability in
the Asia-Pacific area on a large scale. The paper will discuss the inevitable necessity of
improving Sino-American relations and mutual understanding from different perspectives.

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

2

The Future of Sino-American Relations in the Asia-Pacific Realm
THE BACKGROUND OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS
THEIR TRADITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES
In The Federalist, no. 1, Alexander Hamilton wrote:
It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people
of this country to decide, by their conduct and example, the important question,
whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government
from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their
political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the
crisis at which we are arrived may, with propriety, be regarded as the period when
that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in
this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.1
It is true that any regime’s foundation and development is not an easy process since it is
mainly due to two factors which are deeply dependent on each other. The first one is
external force, which may include environmental factors. The other one is internal force,
especially in terms of the wisdom of leaders who can rationally see the external situation
of the country and constantly make appropriate policies that best suit changing
circumstances. Only in this way can the regime maintain stability and benefit its people.
This paper focuses on the analysis of how the U.S. and Chinese governments should
maintain sound relations toward each other in their new Administrations within the
international environment. The presupposition is that improving Sino-American relations
in the twenty-first century by increasing mutual trust and dealing with conflicting
interests realistically benefit not only each other but also the international community.
Since World War Ⅱ, the United States has been the leading power in world
affairs with the strongest military and economy. In the meantime, China has stepped onto
the international stage with its new image as a unified nation. After more than sixty years
1. Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist No.1,” The Library of Congress,
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html (accessed March 3, 2013).
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since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, China is still growing and
developing with both policy achievements and failures. Domestically, the Chinese
government has been constantly learning from its mistakes and trying new policies to
make progress in building a harmonious society. In terms of foreign policy, China firmly
adopted the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence proposed by Premier Zhou En-lai in
1954, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression,
noninterference in other countries’ domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence.
The founding principle of American foreign affairs was stated by President
Washington in his1796 Farewell Address. He exerted his leadership in framing a national
government in which he achieved significant success in the field of foreign affairs by
protecting the territorial integrity of the United States. In the Farewell Address,
Washington asserts that
harmony, liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy,
humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and
impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences;
consulting the natural course of things….There can be no greater error than to
expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion, which
experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.2
This short remark shows that it was in the interests of the United States to steer clear of
foreign entanglements.
Article Two in Chapter One of the UN Charter states: “All Members shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with

2. “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796,” Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp, (accessed March 3, 2013).
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the Purposes of the United Nations.”3 Since “developing friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace”4 are among the most basic
principles of the UN, external interference in national disputes or disputed areas should
be treated as unlawful. Both the United States and China acknowledge this in their
foreign policy statements.
Today, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the conflicting
interpretations of international security and international order between China and the
United States based on different traditions and cultures continue to be a source of tension
between them. Many scholars believe that the dramatic expansion of China’s economic
and military power has been raising the question of mutual trust and true cooperation in
Sino-American relations. The future is unforeseeable. However, their common interests
are far greater than the disputes between the two countries.
THE CURRENT CONDITION OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS—WHAT
SHOULD BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR?
First of all, any analysis of Sino-American relations in the future decades requires
familiarity with the current status or condition of these two countries’ relationship. Aaron
L. Friedberg, a professor at Princeton University and former deputy assistant for national
security of the United States, helps summarize the main determining factors of the two
countries’ relations in his book A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the
Struggle for Mastery in Asia. Friedberg believes that there are seven distinct factors for

3. “Charter of the United Nations,” http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
(accessed March 3, 2013).
4., Ibid.

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

5

understanding the development of Sino-American relations: the narrowing gap in national
power, the continuing deep differences in their ideologies and domestic political
structures, economic interdependence, the possible evolution of China toward democracy,
China’s ongoing integration into a web of international institutions, the presence of
common threats, and the existence of nuclear weapons.5 Among these factors, the first
two are deeply entrenched factors which might cause most potentially dangerous effects.
The benefits of trade and a common concern about nuclear weapons are moderating
factors. China’s involvement in international institutions and cooperation with The
United States on mutual dangers such as terrorism and climate change do not help
promote long-lasting friendship, because China and the United States have not achieved a
consensus on the precise nature of the threat, and the real problem in Sino-American
relations is the divergence of interests and the tensions and the mutual mistrust that make
cooperation so difficult in the first place. According to Friedberg, only China’s political
evolution toward liberalization could bring a stable peace with America.6 Throughout
history, Sino-U.S. relations had never been so “mixed, complex, uncertain, and
potentially unstable”7 than in the twenty-first century.
Robert D. Kaplan, a journalist and Stratfor analyst who has been recognized as
one of the world’s top hundred global thinkers, wrote a remarkable book on geopolitics
entitled Monsoon, in which he argues that the current decade is faced with a newly
emerging international order that concentrates on the Indian Ocean and the western
5. Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in
Asia (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 37.
6. Ibid., 38.
7. Ibid., 2.
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Pacific. Similarly to Friedberg, he also believes that the Pacific Asia is going to be the
most disputed area in the twenty-first century. Kaplan points out that since China has
been increasingly building its navy and improving economically, its potential to seek
energy and enhance its national defense indicate that it will focus on developing its naval
strategy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Although China’s maritime power is not yet
competitive with that of the United States, and its internal problems may restrain its
economic prosperity, other factors such as America’s economic recession, Asia’s naval
development since WWII, and non-state factors, such as piracy, have ended America’s
unipolar moment on the world’s oceans and have made China its primary competitor.8 In
order to retain its influence in Asia, Kaplan believes that it is not enough for America to
maintain large quantity of its naval forces there because of other factors, such as
“underlying trends, asymmetric capabilities, and the creative combination of naval,
economic, and territorial power.”9 Friedberg similarly asserts that, despite Asia’s political
and social lag, the international system has been shifting ever since the second half of the
twentieth century toward “a dramatic improvement in material conditions across virtually
all of Asia” under its environment of “overall regional peace and stability, and the
creation of an increasingly open global economy.”10 The fact is that multipolarity is
creating balance of power in the Pacific. In spite of this reality, Friedberg’s simple
assumption is that “if China’s power continues to grow, and if it continues to be ruled by
a one-party authoritarian regime, its relations with the United States are going to become

8. Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon (New York: Random House, 2011), 279.
9. Ibid., 281.
10. Friedberg, 22-23.
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increasingly tense and competitive.”11 The question is: What is China’s foreign policy?
Will China seek Pacific hegemony?
Kaplan partly agrees with Friedberg’s point when he states that “it is China’s very
geographical centrality to Asia, coupled with its growing navy and burgeoning economic
might that may cause the U.S. to continue to lose influence there.”12 The difference
between Friedberg and Kaplan is that while Friedberg believes that a diminishing
national power gap and conflicting ideologies are the fundamental roots of U.S. and
China’s rivalry, Kaplan thinks that the determining force driving an edgy Sino-American
relationship will be the interaction of their navies in the Indian Ocean and West Pacific.13
Kaplan does not believe China intends a global hegemony. The deep reason for China’s
expanding navy is her demand for energy to sustain dramatic economic growth. Statistics
show that China will probably become the world’s most prolific shipbuilder, exceeding
Japan and South Korea.14 Kaplan compares China’s current position with America’s
situation during the period of the Panama Canal construction when the U.S. attempted to
develop strategic economic and military interests with the outside world. Today, China
has the tendency to dominate the Malacca Strait in order to access to the Indian Ocean.
Its purpose is to import oil via pipelines from Central Asia and Saudi Arabia as well as
natural gas from Iran. In addition, Kaplan holds that China seeks to control the South
China Sea to secure the First Island Chain, especially Taiwan, the Diao Yu (Senkaku)

11. Ibid., 38.
12. Kaplan, Monsoon, 281.
13. Ibid., 280.
14. Kaplan, 282.
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Islands, and the Nan Sha (Spratly) Islands. If China achieves the status of a two-ocean
power, conflicts with both India and America are inevitable.
Despite the question whether the ultimate driving force of Sino-American
relations lies in their ideological conflicts according to Friedberg or in their maritime
territories in the Pacific Asia according to Kaplan, it is also important for policymakers to
consider enduring factors that promote peace. For example, Kaplan believes that these
geographical controversies can be handled realistically: “Strong American-Chinese
bilateral relations going forward is not only plausible, but might be the best-case scenario
for the global system in the twenty-first century, allowing for true world governance to
take shape.”15 The possibility of improving cooperation is also envisioned by Friedberg:
“A deepening US.-China entente would bring with it increased possibilities for stable,
sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful resolution of outstanding regional
disputes, and the successful management of pressing global problems including terrorism,
climate change, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” 16 But both the United States
and China face obstacles to reach this goal. The United States should consider how it
should respond responsibly to a coming international system of multi-polarity17 and
realize the peaceful transition toward an American-Indian-Chinese condominium.18 For
China, the primary question might be associated with its domestic policy since “China’s

15. Ibid., 280.
16. Friedberg, 36.
17. Kaplan, Monsoon , 291.
18. Ibid., 293.
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internal system has vibrant and intense debates on policy and social direction, which will
delay its movement toward great power status.”19 This may delay peaceful cooperation.
THE IMPORTANCE OF GEOGRAPHY IN UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S
POLITICS
Following the year in which Monsoon was published, Kaplan wrote another book
called Revenge of Geography. He argues that, although geography is not the determining
factor in studying world affairs, it is of primary significance. He quotes the great Dutch
American strategist Nicholas J. Spykman’s observation: “Geography is the most
fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent.
Ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed.” 20 He
also quotes English geographer Sir Halford John Mackinder, who is regarded as one of
the founding fathers of geostrategy: “Geography bridges the gap between arts and science,
connecting the study of history and culture with environmental factors, which specialists
in humanities sometimes neglect.”21 As a result, in order to comprehend both China’s and
America’s domestic and foreign policies, one effective method is to understand how they
have dealt with geography throughout history. Kaplan warns that
while no one state in Asia has any incentives to go to war, the risks of incidents at
sea and fatal miscalculations about the balance of power—which everyone is

19. Kaplan, Monsoon , 280.
20. Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the
Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942), xv, 41, quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of
Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate (New York:
Random House, 2012), 29.
21. W. H. Parker, Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
93, 130-131, quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, 28.
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seeking to constantly adjust—will have a tendency to increase with time and with
the deepening complexity of the military standoff.22
“The U.S.-China relationship will not only be determined by such bilateral and global
issues as trade, debt, climate change, and human rights, but more importantly by the
specific geography of China’s potential sphere of influence in maritime Asia.”23
Kaplan points out that China’s geography highly reflects a “core-periphery”
structure since its civilization originated in the rivers of the central plain. China absorbed
barbarian ethnic groups and cultures through different stages in which the Han and Tang
dynasties achieved their apex when China’s influence extended to the Pacific, Europe,
and Africa. In addition, because China is mainly a continental power, threats to it over the
millennia have come from the northern and northwestern uplands inhabited by Mongols,
a Turkic people.24 This exacerbated the centralization. Facing aggressive invaders and
later territorial controversies with Russia and Japan, “China became a vast continent in
and of itself by virtue of its continental backwards and forwards interactions with an
Inner Asian steppe-land that stretched into Mackinder’s Heartland, and this is what drives
the political reality of China today.” 25 Nowadays, China’s border issue is still very
severe. Kaplan asserts that “Mongolia, the Russian Far East, Central Asia, and Southeast
Asia are all natural zones of Chinese influence and expansion, even though no political
borders will change.”26

22. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, 223.
23. Ibid., 217.
24. Ibid., 192.
25. Ibid., 195.
26. Ibid., 210.
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In reference to the assumption that China’s primary obstacle to cooperate with the
United States is associated with its domestic instability, we must ask: where does this
instability come from? Kaplan argues that: “what drives China beyond its official borders
has to be with a core national interest—economic survival and growth.”27 However, he
continues: “China’s borders aren’t the problem: the problem is Chinese society, which, as
it becomes more prosperous, and, as China’s economic growth rate slows, raises the
specter of political upheaval of some sort. And serious upheaval could make China
suddenly vulnerable on its ethnic peripheries.”28 So the implication is that China’s
internal instability largely comes from the pause of economic growth, and that China’s
outward expansion is not only due to the requirement of natural resources for protecting
economic growth, but also represents strategy of national defense to prevent ethnic
conflicts when the economy slows down.
AMERICA’S CONTEMPORARY POLICY DILEMMAS
In the article “The Lost Decade,” Angelo Codevilla assumes that the “War on
Terror” beginning on September 11, 2001 has marked the decline of America as “the
world’s only superpower.” By tracing the deep reason which caused this phenomenon, he
suspects that the problem lies in the traditional bipartisan mainstream. Codevilla asserts
that the ruling class has been failing to answer the question of what it has been pursuing.
He asserts that war should empower a nation and its ruling class because “hard times
force regimes, as they force individuals, to prove what they are made of.”29 However, the
27. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography, 199.
28. Ibid., 207.
29. Angelo M. Codevilla, “The Lost Decade,” The Claremont Institute,
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1878/article_detail.asp (accessed April 11, 2013).
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current ruling leadership, including both the Republican and Democratic parties, has
failed to address qualitative changes in domestic policies and foreign affairs or politics
since the War on Terror. The reason is that “a decade of war brought a government ever
bigger and more burdensome” and “the ruling class justified its ever-larger role in
America’s domestic life by redefining war as a never-ending struggle against unspecified
enemies for abstract objectives and by asserting expertise far above that of ordinary
American.”30 According to Codevilla,
U.S. policy has made things worse because the liberal internationalists, realists,
and neoconservatives who make up America’s foreign policy Establishment have
all assumed that Americans should undertake the impossible task of changing
such basic facts, rather than confining themselves to the difficult but vital work of
guarding U.S. interests against them. For the Establishment, 9/11 meant
opportunities to press for doing more of what they had always tried to do.31
The basic facts to which he refers are challenges of peace in the Pacific, neo-Soviet
Russia, Western Europe, and the Muslim world.
Specifically, Codevilla argues that the eagerness of the ruling class for victory
against terrorism has transformed the American military mind. The attempt to build
friendly nations has caused degrading of the U.S. military. As a result, both the structures
and missions of the American land, sea, and air armed forces have been focused on War
on Terror. This has “materially crippled America’s capacity for dealing with any other
kind of war” by neglecting other major competitive powers.32 He maintains that “the
common denominator of the ruling class’ domestic and international strategy in the post9/11 decade is the determination to double its bet on already failed politics. This self30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
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referential mindset is the root cause of America’s decade of loss.” He adds that
“confronting terrorists is not what the U.S.’s ‘security’ people sign up for.”33
In the article “The Geographical Containment of China,” Francis P. Sempa
maintains that China’s development in aerospace and naval programs over the recent two
decades is magnificent. With its “continental size, access to the ocean, a huge and
productive population, a growing economy, a growing military capacity,” China has the
potential to challenge the global political system.34 He emphasizes that the development
of China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles would particularly challenge America’s regional
strategic balance and other regional powers’ security by controlling communications and
strategic passages. He worries that Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power theory might help
account for China’s current military doctrine. Even though he does not actually believe
that China has a global expansionary ambition, and that China’s economic ties with the
U.S. would largely benefit both of them, China’s regional ambitions and increasingly
growing influence in the Pacific are “inconsistent with U.S. security interests and
commitments in the region.”35 According to Sempa, “China’s expansion and/or naval
breakout will likely emerge from her lengthy coastline to the east. It is that direction that
U.S.-Chinese interests clash.”36 He particularly mentions the geographical importance of
Taiwan since “were Taiwan to fall under Chinese control, a central and crucial link in this
series of island and peninsular barriers would be unhinged, crippling this containment

33. Ibid.
34. Francis P. Sempa, “The Geographical Containment of China,” The Mackinder Forum,
http://mackinderforum.org/commentaries/the-geopolitical-containment-of-china (accessed April 11, 2013).
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
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perimeter.”37 He warns that the U.S. must retain its sea command to the approaches of the
main chokepoints and renew strategic ties with Pacific allies.
Sempa’s standpoint is in accordance with Friedberg’s view that if China’s power
continues to grow, its relations with the United States are going to become increasingly
tense and competitive. He also shares the same view with Kaplan that Sino-American
relationship in the Pacific-Asia is determined by their controls of chokepoints. However,
the more crucial question is how to define America’s interest in the Pacific Asia as well
as what it means by interest conflicts between America and China. It has already been
noted that these two countries have different histories, traditions, and cultures when
interpreting the principles of international security and international order. If the United
States views the balance of power as the principle of international security, and China’s
dramatic rise will violate this principle and threaten the interest of other nations in the
Pacific Asia, China might view the principle of international order differently. In addition,
both Sempa and Kaplan agree that China does not seek regional hegemony in the PacificAsia at first hand. If China and the United States continue to intensify their rivalry in the
Pacific-Asia and enforce conflicting ideologies on each other, it may cause another
unnecessary war, as criticized by Codevilla.
As a result, the ultimate driving force of Sino-American relations neither lies in
their ideological conflicts, according to Friedberg, nor in their maritime territories in the
Asia-Pacific, according to Kaplan, but lies in these two countries’ determination to
increase mutual understanding, especially the common ground of a just international
system in the Pacific-Asia.

37. Ibid.
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CONFLICTING POLITICAL THEORIES APPLIED TO THE EAST ASIA
The book International Relations Theory and the Asian-Pacific focuses on the
future international relations of East Asia regarding the roles of the main powers in this
area, particularly China and the United States. David Kang illustrates a general picture of
East Asia from a historical perspective. He says that
Asian international relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and
more stable than that of the west. From this perspective, until the intrusion of the
western powers in the nineteenth century, Asian international relations were
remarkably stable, punctuated only occasionally by conflict between
countries….Consisting of China as the central state, and the peripheral states as
lesser states or “vassals,” as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need
for interstate war. This contrasts sharply with the western tradition of international
relations that consisted of formal equality between nation-states, informal
hierarchy, and almost constant interstate conflict.38
Kang maintains that, in order to pursue the stability in the East Asia, it is vital to
comprehend the competing worldviews between the West and the East in terms of the
reality of international relations, which is the root of enduring conflict. He believes that
“the major difference between Europe and Asia was that conflicts between the states in
the hierarchy were centuries apart, and tended to occur as order within the central power
was breaking down.”39 Another difference is that in Asia “the countries remained
essentially the same after the war—there was no shifting and malleable boundaries that
were redefined, and nations did not rise and disappear.”40 In other words, Asia’s situation
does not fit into the Western theory of balance of power.

38. David Kang, “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations,” in International
Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003), 164.
39. Kang, 170.
40. Ibid., 170.
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Kang points out that realism has prevailed in the western thinking about
international relations, which holds that only anarchy and hierarchy exist in the
international system. The anarchy system emphasizes on “poles and alliance” to reach a
state of equality, while the hierarchy consists of “either formal or informal empire.”41
However, according to Kang, “hierarchy is not hegemony: hegemony is overarching and
more intrusive. Hegemony also focuses the bulk of its attention to the largest power,
while hierarchy is more concerned with the interaction of states up and down the
hierarchy. Hierarchy also accords all states within the system a place and a means of
interacting with each other.”42 Asia has been historically entrenched in such a system.
Kang maintains that in a stable hierarchy system, “there is one central state and many
lesser, peripheral states.” By contrast, the western realism emphasizes the principle that
“self-help forces nations to coalesce against the would-be dominant power.”43As a result,
the main question was “whether all nations understand that the central state had no
territorial or overweening ambitions, and whether there exists a method for resolving
conflicts.”44
Specifically, Kang maintains that the reason why the hierarchy system provides
stability is that it has a “combination of benefits and sanctions that the central power
provides to the lesser powers,” as “good relations with the central state ensures survival
and even prosperity by the lesser states, through a continual flow of good trade, and

41. Ibid., 165.
42. Ibid., 166.
43. Ibid., 165.
44. Kang, 166.
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technology.”45 If the lesser states violate this principle, “the central state reserves the
right to use force to restore order” by imposing the new order on the rest of the peripheral
states.” As a result, the lesser states “realize that to challenge the hierarchy would be
against their own interests.”46 In addition, Kang emphasizes that “there is little
interference by the central power in the affairs of the lesser states in hierarchy” because
of the fact that “both the central and the lesser states explicitly recognize the central
state’s dominant position,” and thus they develop “shared norms that allows for
communication,” which can contribute to “mitigate the security dilemma.”47 After this
relationship is established, “the central state respects the autonomy and sovereignty of
lesser states,” and “the lesser states retain full autonomy of domestic organization and
foreign policy, and full authority to order their relations with each other”48 without the
central state’s concern.
According to Kang’s perspective, “while realists and liberals have tended to view
modern Asia as potentially unstable, if the system is reverting to a pattern of hierarchy,
the result may be increased stability.”49 So, if the system of hierarchy can ultimately and
realistically bring stability and prosperity in East Asia, how should the major powers
which are located in or concerned with that area react? Kang asserts that a hierarchy view
of Asia will have significant implications for American foreign policy. He believes that
the situation will be problematic if the U.S. remains tightly involved in Asia and forms
45. Ibid., 167.
46. Ibid., 167.
47. Ibid., 168.
48. Ibid., 168.
49. Ibid., 164.
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East Asian balancing coalitions to contain China.50 On the other hand, if the U.S.
withdraws significantly from East Asia, the region might not become as dangerous and
unstable as the conventional wisdom expects.51
From China’s standpoint, Kang asserts that China has a flexible worldview, and
its view on international relations is subtle as it is “comfortable with a loose definition of
nation.”52 This is why it holds “one nation, two systems,” leaves its border with India
never fully defined and resolved, and maintains a loose relation with Tibet.53 In terms of
the Taiwan issue, Kang believes that “in a hierarchy, the other Asian states recognize
China’s right to order its border. In addition, other nations see China-Taiwan relations as
an internal affair.”54 From the Western balance of power perspective, it is natural for the
scholars of international relations to keep being cautious about China’s rising and making
assumptions of its dominant ambition in East Asia. And it is easy for them to believe that
Taiwan has a strategic position in China’s expansions, as both Kaplan and Sempa have
indicated.
Specifically, Kang believes that Taiwan has remained in an ambiguous
relationship with China throughout history because Taiwan “historically was not a formal
province of China, but it was also not a recognized independent state in the manner of
Korea, Japan, and Vietnam.” Official Chinese records regard Taiwan as a frontier area in

50. Ibid., 164.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 180.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
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the eighteenth century.55 Currently, Taiwan’s continuing shift to democracy makes it
more and more distinct from China, and most Western countries have started to see it as a
nation-state. However, China will always treat Taiwan as an internal issue. Nations in
Asia also react to the Taiwan issue differently from the Western world with a muted
attitude regarding China’s military intervention because they instinctively believe that
Taiwan should be a “quasi-nation” which “enjoys the benefits of the international
system.”56 As a result, Taiwan’s status as a nation-state would provoke and extremely
upset it.57
Friedberg and Kaplan in their books examine the general picture of today’s Asia
seriously, and both of them mention that East Asia is in a dramatic process of
development. Friedberg maintains that the politics of Asia do not match its material
conditions. Also, Kaplan emphasizes that miscalculations about the balance of power in
Asia can have fatal consequences. Actually Kang’s main thesis, however, is that “there is
more security and stability in Asia than it is generally realized,” but the stable hierarchy
system which produces a secure and stable has been shadowed by the realist balance of
power principle.58 More importantly, he asserts that one distinctive feature of the
hierarchy system is that it only functions efficiently during good times. Otherwise, “when
the central state experiences trouble and the hierarchy breaks down, order is more easily
upset.”59

55. Ibid., 178.
56. Ibid., 179.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., 164.
59. Ibid., 168.
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So, the assumption here is that there is a chain effect: China’s internally vibrant
and unstable system, which is mentioned by Kaplan, could potentially cause the collapse
of the hierarchy system in the Pacific Asia, which would then produce a general political
and social lag in that area as suggested by Friedberg. This, in turn, makes China’s
dominant position more apparent, leading to the Western interference in this area for fear
of the loss of balance of power. But even if this assumption works, David Kang argues,
that although the hierarchy system historically provided stability in Asia, it is
questionable whether it could still be applied today because “no modern state will seek
investiture from China regarding its chief executive, nor will any country pay tribute to
China.”60 As a result, communications and mutual understanding, either between China
and its peripheral nations or between China and the United States, is of vital necessity in
terms of how to maintain East Asia’s political security and stability. Imposing conflicting
worldviews on each other can never solve international problems, and only mutual
understanding could bring about mutual trust and mutual benefit.
LACK OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
Dean Cheng, a Heritage Foundation scholar, in his “The Complicated History of
U.S. Relations with China,” depicts the complex relationship that has existed between
these two countries since the beginning. The foreign policy of the U.S. toward China
varies according to the changes of world conditions. In terms of today’s situation, he
points out that
the United States and the People’s Republic of China are like the European great
powers of a century ago. They trade with each other, but do not trust each other.
They have the largest economics in the world, and they have a financial and

60. Ibid., 174.
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trading relationship that shapes the global economy. But at the same time, they
have different, and opposing, views on many national security and foreign policy
issues.61
He implies that the U.S. policy makers should be clear about the conflicting interests with
China. Besides that, “the U.S. should work with China” when their interests coincide.62
Actually, there are numerous perspectives on Sino-US mutual benefits and cooperation.
The world is now in the space age. If the U.S. and China were able to improve
cooperation, it would benefit the people on a large scale.
Yi Zhou, a distinguished Chinese scholar and member of the Center for Space
Science and Applied Research, identifies both China and the United States as “major
players in the human access to and exploration of space.” Both governments support
space collaboration with foreign nations in this field,63 but they have no official
agreement with each other on space cooperation. Most of the authors mentioned above,
and numerous other scholars, warn that China’s development in military and space will
threaten the international balance of power. Yi Zhou also maintains that the possible
reason why there is no official agreement yet is that “China is concerned with the
implications of U.S. military space capabilities for its security interests, and the U.S.
reciprocally is concerned with the potential build-up of Chinese capabilities to counter
U.S. military space capabilities.”64 But he emphasizes that cooperation in space will

61. Dean Cheng, “The Complicated History of U.S. Relations with China,” The Heritage
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/the-complicated-history-of-us-relationswith-china (accessed April 30, 2013).
62. Ibid.
63. Yi Zhou, “Perspectives on Sino-U.S. Cooperation in Civil Space Programs,” Space Policy 24,
no. 3 (2008): 132.
64. Ibid., 133.
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actually benefit both the countries. For example, “Chinese participation in U.S.-led space
exploration would send a strong signal to the world of good U.S.-China relations, which
would be good for U.S. international relations and would provide geopolitical benefits.”
65

In addition, cooperation could enhance America’s understanding about China’s space

development accurately, advance scientific studies, reduce the risk and cost of space
exploration by a single nation, and benefit America’s space industry.66 Yi Zhou indicates
that the main obstacles to achieve formal cooperation lie in geopolitical and space policy
problems because of the lack of mutual understanding.
If the United States and China increase mutual understanding, they could
cooperate in other area besides space, such as promoting regional peace. Prince Hassan of
Jordan holds that the East-West world power balance is significant which should be
promoted by “an authentic Euro-Atlantic policy toward the west Asian region.”67 The
reason is that the development of nuclear weapons as well as conflicts over controlling
chokepoints to the oil reserves in that area will be the main causes of regional instability
in the next decade. He asserts that the United Nations (especially the five permanent
members) and the European Union should launch more actions to suppress west Asia’s
unstable factors as “the emergence of a free and stable region on the southern flank of
Nato and astride east-west communication lines, for example, would be a powerful
enhancement of human security and global sustainability—even more were it to create

65. Ibid., 134.
66. Ibid., 134.
67. Prince Hassan, “Halford Mackinder’s New World,” Open Democracy,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/halford-mackinder-s-new-world (accessed April 11, 2013).
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regional, inner-directed ‘smart power.’”68 He criticizes narrow nationalism and expects
“the revival of a religious philanthropy of spirit” which would contribute to “undercut
moral and economic deprivation.”69 He argues for a transnational, supranational, and
regional cooperation over “natural and human resources as well as environmental and
human-security issues”70 in the Middle East. Similarly, if the United States and China
cooperate over natural and human resources and environmental and human-security
issues in the Pacific-Asia, the security and stability in that area would be largely
improved.
THE FUTURE
Jianfei Liu, a Chinese professor at the Institute for International Strategic Studies
of China published an article called “Sino-U.S. Relations and Building a Harmonious
World,” in which he provides general perspectives on Sino-American future cooperation.
He argues that from Chinese perspective,
while advocating a harmonious world, China is promoting the building of a
harmonious society domestically. The harmonious society is characterized by not
only prosperity but also democracy and rule by law, equity and justice, stability
and order, and the harmonious coexistence of humans and nature. Both
harmonious society and a harmonious world are from the same philosophy.71
America’s advocacy of “freedom, democracy, peace, governing by law and prosperity” is
in accordance with “the philosophy behind the concept of a harmonious world.”72 He
believes that despite the fact that different social systems would lead to confrontations,
68. Hassan.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Jianfei Liu, “Sino-U.S. Relations and Building a Harmonious World,” Journal of
Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009): 479.
72. Ibid., 479.
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this traditional fate among major powers in the history can be avoided if “the long term
interests and happiness of the countries’ citizens are to be considered.”73
However, according to Liu, even though China and the United States share a
common goal of building a harmonious and safe world, their different ideologies lead to
different interpretations of a harmonious world. For example, China believes “diversity
of civilization is a basic characteristic of human society” while the United States tends to
always “promote Western democracy around the world.”74 Also, “China advocates a
multilateral approach to resolving security issues” while the United States has been
“integrating unilateralism with multilateralism” in terms of how to maintain international
security.75 In order to improve mutual understanding, he suggests that the two should
“strengthen cooperation, build strategic mutual trust,” especially by understanding
China’s choice of a peaceful rise.76 According to Liu, “democracy is one of China’s
objectives; the Chinese nation has been striving for it for a century. But China has also
taken many detours and encountered many frustrations in its pursuit of democracy. China
must develop a mode of democratic politics that tailors to its own unique situation.”77
It has been previously noted that a deepening US.-China entente would bring with
it increased possibilities for stable, sustained worldwide economic growth, the peaceful
resolution of outstanding regional disputes, and the successful management of pressing
global problems including terrorism, climate change, and the proliferation of nuclear

73. Ibid., 480.
74. Ibid., 482.
75. Ibid., 483.
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weapons. But both the United States and China face obstacles to reach this goal. The
United States should consider how it should respond responsibly to a coming
international system of multi-polarity and realize the peaceful transition toward an
American-Indian-Chinese condominium. For China, the primary question might be
associated with its domestic policy since China’s internal system has vibrant and intense
debates on policy and social direction. In the future, in order to increase mutual
understanding and mutual trust in Sino-American relations, the United States should
respect China’s economic development in its unique situation, and China should develop
more cooperative dialogues among the United States and other Pacific-Asian states in
terms of mutual benefits.
CONCLUSION
The ruling class of the United States in the current decade needs to examine its
foreign policy and find out what the true goals it needs to pursue globally. This paper
assumes that the U.S. in the future will facilitate more dialogues among the Asia-Pacific
countries by the reality that there exist great opportunities for reciprocity. Asia needs
America’s respect to its traditional order to maintain stability, and the United States needs
Asia’s cooperation concerning mutual threats and mutual benefits. The best method for
enhancing cooperation is through mutual understanding, in terms of different geopolitical
reality and conflicting values.

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

26
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cheng, Dean. “The Complicated History of U.S. Relations with China.” The Heritage
Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/10/the-complicatedhistory-of-us-relations-with-china. (accessed February 21, 2013).
Codevilla, Angelo M. “The Lost Decade.” The Claremont Institute.
http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1878/article_detail.asp (accessed
April 11, 2013).
Friedberg, Aaron L. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle
for Mastery in Asia. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012.
Hamilton, Alexander. “Federalist No. 1.” The Library of Congress.
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_01.html (accessed March 3, 2013).

Hassan, Prince. “Halford Mackinder’s New World.” Open Democracy.
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/halford-mackinder-s-new-world (accessed
April 11, 2013).
Ikenberry, G. John, and Mastanduno, Michael, eds. International Relations Theory and
the Asia-Pacific. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Kang, David. “Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations.” In International
Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael
Mastanduno, 164. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Kaplan, Robert D. Monsoon. New York: Random House, 2011.
________. The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts
and the Battle against Fate. New York: Random House, 2012.
Liu, Jianfei. “Sino-US Relations and Building a Harmonious World.” Journal of
Contemporary China 18, no. 60 (2009): 479-490. (accessed February 21, 2013).
Parker, W.H. Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998. Quoted in Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map
Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate. New York: Random
House, 2012.
Sempa, Francis P. “The Geographical Containment of China.” The Mackinder Forum.
http://mackinderforum.org/commentaries/the-geopolitical-containment-of-china
(accessed April 11, 2013).
Spykman, Nicholas J. America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

27

Balance of Power. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942. Quoted in Robert D.
Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming
Conflicts and the Battle against Fate. New York: Random House, 2012.
United Nations. “Charter of the United Nations.”
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml (accessed March 3, 2013).
Washington, George. “Washington’s Farewell Address 1796.” Yale Law School Lillian
Goldman Law Library. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp. (accessed
March 3, 2013).

Zhou, Yi. “Perspectives on Sino-US Cooperation in Civil Space Programs.” Space Policy
24, no. 3 (August 2008): 132-139.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964608000404. (accessed
February 21, 2013).

